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INTRODUCTION 
Sexual harassment in educational institutions has been a salient issue in 
education policy and victim advocacy on a state and federal level since the 
late 1950s.1  Harassment of any kind has adverse effects on the learning and 
                                                          
 1. “Sexual harassment” is used throughout to include acts of sexual violence 
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development experience that students receive at an educational institution.2  
Numerous studies in recent years have shown how sexual harassment in 
educational institutions has particularly lasting educational, health, social, 
and economic implications for its victims.3  The issue of sexual harassment 
in educational institutions has been acknowledged since the civil rights era; 
however, no meaningful federal legislation existed to combat the problem 
until Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.4  Prior 
to promulgating these federal protections for students, the federal 
government established protections against sexual harassment in the 
workplace with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 
New federal guidance and state laws have broadened protections for 
individuals covered under Title IX.6  Recently, the Third Circuit expanded 
the protections provided under Title IX by deciding that an employee at a 
teaching hospital can bring a sexual harassment claim under both statutes.7  
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit was incorrect in determining 
that medical residents can sue under either statute, and that the Fifth Circuit 
                                                          
including assault. See Eilene Zimmerman, Campus Sexual Assault: A Timeline of Major 
Events, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/education/
campus-sexual-assault-a-timeline-of-major-events.html (compiling a list of major sexual 
assault cases from 1957 to 2016). 
 2. See Beverly M. Black & Cecilia Mengo, Violence Victimization on a College 
Campus: Impact on GPA and School Dropout, 18 J. OF C. STUDENT RETENTION: RES., 
THEORY & PRAC. 234, 242-46 (2015) (analyzing the impact of sexual harassment on 
victims’ academic performance and school retention). 
 3. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS, ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) viii 
(Oct. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Nat’l Crim. Just. Reference Serv.) 
(examining the prevalence, nature, and reporting of sexual harassment experienced by 
students on college campuses). 
 4. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-83, 1685-88 (1972) (codifying protections against 
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational institutions). 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2010) (codifying protections against discrimination on 
the basis of sex in the workplace); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2018) (establishing sexual 
harassment as a violation of section 703 of Title VII). 
 6. See Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process That Is Due: Preponderance of the 
Evidence as the Standard of Proof for University Adjudications of Student-on-Student 
Sexual Assault Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1642-45 (2012) (advocating for 
continued clarification and guidance surrounding the protections provided under Title 
IX). 
 7. John Barry and Edna Guerrasio, A Circuit Split At Intersection of Title VII And 
Title IX, LAW360 (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/913845/a-circuit-
split-at-intersection-of-title-vii-and-title-ix (explaining this change is significant because 
Title IX does not require administrative exhaustion and has a better statute of 
limitations). 
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was correct in establishing that Title VII provides the sole remedy for 
medical residents to sue for sexual harassment.8  This Comment examines 
the reasons future courts should defer to the Fifth Circuit’s decision. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief legislative history of Title VII and 
Title IX and introduces the cases related to each statute.9  Part I also 
introduces the circuit court cases that address whether Title VII provides the 
sole remedy to individuals who wish to bring a sexual harassment claim in a 
teaching hospital.10  Part II supports the Fifth Circuit’s assertion that Title 
VII and its subsequent case law preempts Title IX as a remedy for employees 
of educational institutions who have experienced discrimination on the basis 
of sex.11  Part III discusses the policy recommendation for why Title IX 
should not provide a bypass to Title VII’s well-established remedial process 
for addressing cases of discrimination on the basis of sex in teaching 
hospitals.12  Part IV concludes that the Fifth Circuit is correct in this circuit 
split.13 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Federal Government has made strides to promote the rights of victims 
of sexual harassment by carefully balancing the needs of survivors with the 
rights of accused parties under Title IX.14  Over the past twenty years, there 
have been various legislative efforts to protect victims of sexual 
harassment.15  Discrimination against employees on the basis of sex was 
outlawed in the United States with the passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.16  
A decade later, Congress also outlawed discrimination on the basis of sex in 
                                                          
 8. See id. (describing the Third Circuit’s view that medical residents should be able 
to recover under both Title VII and Title IX). 
 9. Infra Part I. 
 10. Infra Part I. 
 11. Infra Part II. 
 12. Infra Part III. 
 13. Infra Part IV. 
 14. See Lauren Sieben, Education Dept. Issues New Guidance for Sexual-Assault 
Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (Apr. 4, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/
Education-Dept-Issues-New/127004/ (explaining the evolving guidelines under Title 
IX). 
 15. See HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., NAT’L INST. JUST., SEXUAL ASSAULT ON 
CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT ii, 1-2 (2005), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf (acknowledging the efforts made to 
protect victims of sexual assault utilizing Title IX and accompanying legislation). 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2010) (outlawing discrimination based on sex, race, 
color, nationality, and religion). 
4
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss1/3
2018] FOLLOWING THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 77 
 
educational institutions by passing Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972.17  Since then, the federal government has worked to expand and 
clarify the protections available to individuals who experience sexual 
harassment in the workplace and within educational institutions.18 
A. Overview of Employment Discrimination Law Under Title VII and 
Title IX 
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act made it unlawful for employers to 
discriminate against employees with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment based on sex, race, color, national 
origin, and religion.19  Following the enactment of this federal law, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the statutorily-established protection against 
discrimination on the basis of sex in the Supreme Court case Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson.20  In this case, the Supreme Court established that, under 
Title VII, an employee has the right to be free from a “hostile environment” 
created by occurrences of discrimination on the basis of sex.21  Numerous 
types of sexual harassment can create a “hostile environment,” including but 
not limited to quid pro quo sexual harassment, in which certain acts and 
sexual harassment are linked to granting or denying of specific economic 
                                                          
 17. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 168-83, 1685-88 (1972) (prohibiting discrimination that 
excludes an individual from participation in, or denies an individual the benefits of, any 
educational program or activity that receives federal financial assistance). 
 18. See generally Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence from Sec’y for the Office 
of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1-19 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr /letters/ colleague-201104.pdf (providing executive guidance 
expanding the rights of survivors in disciplinary processes at higher education 
institutions); New Requirements Imposed by the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. 1-3 (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.acenet.edu/
news-room/Documents/VAWA-Summary.pdf (providing guidance on the 2013 
reauthorization of VAWA, which extended protections for victims of sexual harassment 
in educational institutions). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (2010) (applying generally to employers with 
fifteen or more employees, including federal, state, and local governments; private and 
public colleges and universities; employment agencies; and labor organizations). 
 20. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59-61, 73 (1986) (discussing 
that plaintiff sued employer after her dismissal, alleging that she was subjected to sexual 
harassment during four years of employment and arguing that this harassment created a 
“hostile working environment” as defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 21. Id. at 65 (relying, in part, on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
guidelines, which identify two types of sexual harassment that constitute discrimination 
on the basis of sex in the workplace: quid pro quo and hostile environment). 
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employment benefits.22  However, the hostile environment sexual 
harassment theory establishes that sexual harassment in the workplace can 
create a hostile or offensive work environment even when economic benefits 
are not readily affected or perceived to be affected.23 
2. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to 
protect students and employees of educational institutions from sexual 
harassment.24  Although there is no specific language in Title IX that 
explicitly mentions protection from any form of sexual violence, the 
Supreme Court later interpreted Title IX to include protection against sexual 
harassment.25  The two seminal cases that imbued Title IX with the authority 
to protect against sexual violence in educational institutions were Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Independent School District and Davis v. Monroe County Board 
of Education.26  In Gebser v. Lago Vista, Alida Gebser, a high school student, 
had a sexual relationship with one of her teachers.27  Through this case, the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether the plaintiff 
can recover damages.28  In Davis v. Monroe County, fifth grader LaShonda 
Davis was sexually harassed by a fellow student.29  The Supreme Court 
                                                          
 22. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN (1979) (voicing the disadvantages of a hostile work environment created by 
sexual harassment). 
 23. Compare Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-66 (contending that women can 
suffer psychological harm from harassment whether it results in the loss of a job benefit 
or not), with Davis v. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650, 653-54 (1999) (determining that 
sexual harassment creates a hostile environment, depriving students of the benefits or 
participation in an educational program or activity on the basis of sex). 
 24. See 20 U.S.C. §1681 (stating that this statute was meant to protect any person 
from being excluded from participation, denied the benefits, or subjected to 
discrimination from any educational program or activity receiving federal funds). 
 25. See id.; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 650, 653-54 (holding schools may be liable 
for student-on-student harassment under Title IX); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1998) (holding a school was not liable for harassment by a 
teacher under Title IX absent actual notice and deliberate indifference). 
 26. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653-54; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93. 
 27. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277-79 (narrating that Gebser sued the district under 
Title IX seeking damages for being subjected to sex-based discrimination in an education 
program). 
 28. See id. at 290-91 (requiring plaintiffs to show that first, the school knew of the 
harassment and second, that the school deliberately failed to respond to the known 
harassment in order to succeed on a Title IX claim). 
 29. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-34 (stating that Davis’s mother sued on her behalf 
alleging that officials from the Monroe County Board of Education failed to address the 
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found that the school officials might have acted with “deliberate 
indifference” in response to Davis’s complaints of harassment, depriving 
LaShonda of an education free from sex-based discrimination promised 
under Title IX, and therefore reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of her 
complaint.30  Although these cases were collectively a step forward toward 
the goal of protecting victims of sex-based harassment, the cases set a high 
bar for a plaintiff to successfully recover damages through a Title IX claim.31 
B. Review of the Split Between the Third and Fifth Circuits 
The case law from which this circuit split derives began with the 1994 
Fourth Circuit case Preston v. Virginia.32  A year later, in Lakoski v. James, 
the Fifth Circuit categorically disagreed with the Fourth Circuit.33  In 1996, 
the Sixth Circuit sided with the Fourth Circuit in Ivan v. Kent State 
University.34  In that same year, the Seventh Circuit sided with the Fifth 
Circuit when the Seventh Circuit determined that Title VII is the “exclusive 
avenue of relief” for employment discrimination claims by medical residents 
who are employed at a teaching hospital.35  The most recent case to revive 
this circuit split was the Third Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Mercy Catholic 
                                                          
harassment). 
 30. See id. at 686, 653-54 (affirming that victims of sexual harassment are denied 
the equal access to education that Title IX means to protect by applying Davis’ factors 
to student-on-student harassment). 
 31. See Grayson Sang Walker, Note, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine 
on Peer Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 95, 110-12 (2010) (emphasizing the 
burdens for victims who attempt to seek relief for the sexual harassment they endure, 
including establishing (1) that the school had knowledge of the harassment and acted in 
deliberate indifference to addressing the harassment and (2) that the harassment created 
a hostile environment that deprived the victim of the benefits of the educational program 
or activity). 
 32. See Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 204-06 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (discussing a case of employment discrimination on the basis of sex in which 
an employee filed a claim against the college where she was employed alleging that the 
college denied her applications for promotions in retaliation). 
 33. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding that 
Title VII provides sole relief for sex-based employment discrimination for rights created 
under Title VII). 
 34. See Ivan v. Kent State Univ., No. 94-4090 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22269, at *5-
8 (6th Cir. July 26, 1996) (holding that individuals can pursue a private right of action 
for employment discrimination under Title IX, regardless of the availability of Title VII 
remedies). 
 35. See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996); Lakoski, 
66 F.3d at 753, 758. 
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Medical Center.36   
1. The Third Circuit Held that Both Title VII and Title IX Provide a 
Remedy for Employment Discrimination Claims on the Basis of Sex. 
The most recent Third Circuit case reversed the preceding district court 
case that concluded Title VII was the sole remedy for employees in federally-
funded education programs to bring claims of discrimination based on sex.37  
In the case Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, plaintiff Jane Doe, a 
former resident at Mercy Catholic Medical Center, brought claims of sex 
discrimination, retaliation, and harassment against the private teaching 
hospital where she previously worked as a medical resident.38  The Third 
Circuit outlined four principles that guided the reversal, including that 
Congress should determine whether it is undesirable to allow employees of 
education programs to circumvent Title VII’s well-established 
administrative requirements through Title IX.39  The Third Circuit arrived at 
these four principles by relying on the Supreme Court cases of Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency Inc., Cannon v. University of Chicago, North 
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, and Jackson v. Birmingham Board Of 
Education.40   
                                                          
 36. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 553-58 (3d. Cir. 2017) (joining 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuit in determining that Title VII is not the sole remedy for 
employment discrimination in teaching hospitals). 
 37. See id. at 553-58, 567 (reversing the district court’s decision that Title VII 
provides the sole remedy to medical residents who could also bring the same claim under 
Title VII). 
 38. See id. at 550-52 (alleging that the director of the hospital’s residency program, 
Dr. James Roe, sexually harassed her and then retaliated against her after she reported 
him to Human Resources, and Mercy Catholic allegedly responded by suspending and 
then terminating Doe from its residency program). 
 39. See id. at 562-63 (determining that (1) medical residents are not limited to Title 
VII as the sole remedy from employment discrimination; (2) if they are, Congress should 
expressly determine that; (3) the provision in the statute that implies Title IX’s private 
cause of action encompasses employees and students; and (4) the cause of action extends 
to employees of federally-funded education programs who allege sex-based retaliation 
claims). 
 40. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171, 173-75, 180 (2005) 
(explaining the four guiding principles used by the Third Circuit to support its decision 
that Doe could bring her claim under Title IX without filing a claim under Title VII); 
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 n.26 (1982) (finding Congress has 
often instituted overlapping remedies); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 693-98 
(1979) (finding a private cause of action implied in Title IX); Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 459, 461 (1975) (holding an individual alleging employment 
discrimination is not deprived of remedies other than those available under Title VII); 
8
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2. The Fifth Circuit Held that Title VII Provides the Sole Remedy for 
Employment Discrimination Claims on the Basis of Sex. 
Courts in the Fifth Circuit have consistently taken the opposite approach 
from the Third Circuit in deciding possible joint liability cases under Title 
VII and Title IX.41  In the Fifth Circuit case Lakoski v. James, the claim that 
Congress intended for Title IX to offer a way to circumvent the 
administrative remedial process carefully crafted under Title VII did not 
persuade the court.42  The court held that it could not say that Title IX 
provided a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to indicate by itself 
that Congress intended to resolve employment discrimination claims via 
Title IX as opposed to Title VII.43  The Fifth Circuit consequently denied 
claims brought by an employee of a medical university under Title IX, 
asserting that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for claims brought by 
individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex.44  
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit claimed that allowing employees to bring a 
private right of action under Title IX would undermine Title VII’s “carefully 
balanced remedial scheme for redressing employment discrimination.”45 
The district court in Doe v. Mercy Catholic also agreed with the Fifth 
Circuit by asserting that there could be no joint liability under Title IX for 
employees in private institutions that receive federal funds and engage in 
some sort of educational program or activity.46  The district court’s assertion 
                                                          
Doe, 850 F.3d at 562-63. 
 41. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1995) (delineating that 
Congress enacted Title VII to provide a remedy for victims of employment 
discrimination and enacted Title IX to enable federal agencies to withhold federal funds). 
42. See id. at 752-53, 758 (stating that a professor filed suit against appellant medical 
school alleging that the denial of her tenure was based on sexual discrimination in 
violation of Title IX). 
 43. Compare id. at 754 (commenting that the only remedy expressly provided in 
Title IX is the termination of federal funds to an education institution that fails to 
adequately address allegations of known sexual harassment), with North Haven Bd. of 
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 552 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that Title IX 
explicitly contains only the one remedy of termination of funds to educational 
institutions). 
 44. Lakoski at 753, 758 (determining the main avenue for resolving claims of 
discrimination based on sex is through Title VII administrative process and not Title IX). 
 45. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d. at 755 (ruling that Congress did not intend for Title IX to 
be a mechanism in which employees could bypass Title VII’s carefully balanced 
remedial scheme). 
 46. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 158 F. Supp. 3d 256, 260-61 (E.D. Pa. 2016) 
(finding that extending Title IX’s coverage to the residency program in question would, 
in effect, rewrite the statute and overstep the bounds of judicial restraint). 
9
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further supports the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that Title VII provides a robust 
remedial process meant to serve as the sole method of relief for individuals 
alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex.47 
II. ANALYSIS  
A. The Fifth Circuit Correctly Determined that Title VII Provides the Sole 
Remedy for Individuals Seeking Relief for Employment Discrimination on 
the Basis of Sex in Federally Funded Educational Institutions. 
The Fifth Circuit correctly determined that Title VII offers the appropriate 
and sole remedy to victims of employment discrimination on the basis of 
sex.48  The Fifth Circuit’s thorough analysis concluded that Congress did not 
enact Title IX to provide a bypass to Title VII’s specific and well-established 
remedial administrative procedures.49  The Fifth Circuit highlighted three 
reasons why Title VII affords the exclusive remedy for claims of 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex.50  First, the circuit court 
established that it does not believe that Congress intended for Title IX to be 
a bypass for Title VII’s well-established remedial procedures.51  Second, the 
court disagreed that the aggregate of Cannon v. University of Chicago, North 
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, and Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public 
Schools added up to an implied right of action that provides an implied 
remedy under Title IX.52  The Fifth Circuit also distinguished these three 
                                                          
 47. See id.; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754, 756 (affirming that Title VII provides the sole 
remedy for individuals alleging sex-based employment discrimination because Congress 
did not intend for Title IX to provide a bypass to Title VII’s well-established 
administrative remedial process). 
 48. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751, 752 (reversing the judgment of the district court in 
favor of the university). 
 49. See id. at 753 (limiting the Court’s holding only to individuals seeking money 
damages). 
 50. See id. at 753-54 (explaining the reasons why Title IX is not the appropriate 
remedy for victims of employment discrimination who could also bring a claim under 
Title VII). 
 51. See id. at 753; (noting that although the plaintiff had a colorable claim under 
Title VII, she did not pursue administrative remedies under that Title); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(d)-(f) (2009) (establishing a specific administrative process that requires an 
individual to pursue administrative remedies before pursuing judicial redress). 
 52. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754 (rejecting Lakoski’s “jurisprudential arithmetic” and 
not finding an implied remedy for employees discriminated on the basis of sex because 
the cases did not address the relationship between Title VII and Title IX). But see Cannon 
v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (finding an implied private cause of action 
under Title IX for an individual against universities); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 
456 U.S. 512, 535 n.26 (1982) (affirming that employment discrimination at educational 
10
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cases from the facts and legal questions presented in Lakoski v. James, 
specifically in relation to the analysis of Title VII and Title IX remedial 
processes.53  Third, the court argues that “Title IX provides limited remedies 
for victims of employment discrimination.”54 
1. The Fifth Circuit’s Reading of Title VII and Title IX Correctly 
Establishes that Congress Intended Title VII to be the Primary Remedial 
Measure for Employment Discrimination Claims. 
Both circuits analyzed congressional intent to varying degrees, but the 
Fifth Circuit provided the more compelling argument to support Congress’s 
remedial intent.55  The Fifth Circuit relied more heavily on its discussion of 
congressional intent for two parts of its analysis.56  The Third Circuit only 
discussed congressional intent in the second part of its four-part argument 
and thus did not sufficiently address Congress’s intent for what remedies 
should exist under each statute.57  The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by 
bringing to light the explicit remedial process that exists under Title VII; the 
same process which was circumvented in Lakoski.58  The Fifth Circuit was 
not persuaded that Congress created Title IX to be a bypass of Title VII’s 
administrative process.59  The Third Circuit, on the other hand, improperly 
asserted that Title VII’s concurrent applicability does not hinder Doe’s 
ability to seek relief under Title IX.60 
                                                          
institutions receiving federal funds falls under Title IX) ; Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. 
Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (finding that actions for money damages may be brought 
through the implied right of action under Title IX). 
 53. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754 (emphasizing that in the three referenced cases, Title 
VII was not implicated). 
 54. See id. (explaining that the sole remedy for expressly stated in Title IX is the 
termination of federal funds). 
 55. See id.; see also Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 559, 564 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (questioning whether Congress intended for Title IX to bypass Title VII’s 
remedial scheme by allowing individuals to seek relief under Title IX for employment 
discrimination claims that could also be brought under Title VII). 
 56. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755-57 (comparing the legislative histories of Title IX 
and Title VII). 
 57. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (arguing that this remedial issue is a matter of “policy,” 
which courts have held need to be addressed by Congress, and not decided by the courts). 
 58. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (referring to Title VII’s well-established remedial 
scheme that requires individuals to first seek administrative remedies before seeking 
redress in the courts). 
 59. See id. 
 60. Compare id. at 758 (concluding that Title VII and Title IX contain the same 
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex, but Congress did not intend to 
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The Fifth Circuit broke down its congressional intent analysis into two 
portions.61  In the first portion, the court effectively concluded that Congress 
intended for Title VII to include the primary damage remedy and therefore 
excluded a damage remedy under Title IX for individuals submitting a claim 
of employment discrimination.62  The court relied on Great American 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny and Brown v. GSA to establish 
that Title VII is the exclusive remedy in cases where the right violated was 
initially created by Title VII because both cases stressed that a more 
“precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”63  In 
the second portion, the Fifth Circuit discussed the remedies that Congress 
wrote into Title VII and Title IX.64 
The Third Circuit failed to properly analyze congressional intent and 
consequently failed to acknowledge that Congress intended for Title VII to 
be the sole relief for employment discrimination in educational institutions 
receiving federal financial assistance.65  The Third Circuit primarily 
discussed congressional intent through the second prong of the four 
principles the court derived to support its decision.66  The court cited Brown 
v. GSA and distinguished it from Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 
to wrongly imply that Johnson points to Title VII not preempting other 
                                                          
create mechanisms under Title IX with which individuals could bypass preexisting Title 
VII remedies), with Doe, 850 F.3d at 563-64, 566 (concluding that Doe could bring her 
retaliation and quid pro quo harassment claims under Title IX, but not reaching the 
hostile environment claim because it was time-barred). 
 61. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754-57 (analyzing which remedies Congress and 
subsequent case law expressly provided remedies under Title IX and remedies Title VII). 
 62. See id. at 756, 758 (finding that Title VII’s extension to local and state 
governments meant that Title IX did not intend to create a bypass for Title VII’s remedial 
scheme). 
 63. See id. at 755. Compare Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (establishing 
that Title VII preempts § 1985 actions because otherwise a complainant would be able 
to avoid most if not all of Title VII’s remedial administrative process), with Great Am. 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) (holding that a violation 
of Title VII cannot also be a cause of action under § 1985(3)). 
 64. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754, 756 (illustrating the contrast between remedies 
under Title VII, which allow individuals to seek redress for claims of employment 
discrimination, with remedies under Title IX, which allow federal agencies to withhold 
funding from educational institutions that do not address claims of employment 
discrimination brought against them). 
 65. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (finding that Title IX’s private cause of action applies 
to employees, as well as students, of federally funded educational institutions). 
 66. See id. at 562 (arguing that this issue is a matter of “policy” that should be 
decided by Congress and not decided in the courts). 
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available remedies in private employment.67  Through this assertion, the 
Third Circuit missed the opportunity to thoroughly address congressional 
intent and instead inadequately used the precedent in North Haven and 
Johnson to argue that the Supreme Court has refused to decide on policy-
based rationales.68 
2. A Private Right of Action for Damages Is Not Established Under Title 
IX Because the Cases Used by the Third Circuit are Distinguished from the 
Lakoski Case and a Well-Established Private Remedy Already Exists 
Under Title VII. 
The district court in Lakoski introduced three Supreme Court decisions to 
argue that, when read together, these cases allow for a private right of action 
to seek damages for employment discrimination claims under Title IX.69  The 
Fifth Circuit correctly rejected the assertion that these cases amounted to an 
implied right of action because all three of these cases failed to address the 
relationship between the remedial processes established in Title VII and Title 
IX.70  The Third Circuit failed to acknowledge and analyze the precedent set 
in Lakoski thoroughly and used the cases North Haven Board of Education 
v. Bell and Cannon v. University of Chicago in an attempt to once again 
construct a private right of action that allows for individuals to recover 
damages under Title IX.71 
                                                          
 67. See id. at 560-61 (noting that the court considered Johnson inapposite in Brown 
because private employment does not raise sovereign immunity issues). Compare 
Brown, 425 U.S. at 835 (1976), (holding that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy to 
federal employees for claims of employment discrimination), with Johnson v. Ry. 
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (suggesting that a victim of employment 
discrimination is not limited to Title VII when seeking relief). 
 68. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (dismissing the issue of bypassing Title VII’s remedial 
scheme as a matter of policy that the Court should not rule on); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 
459; (declining to express a preference for one remedy over another without 
Congressional guidance); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) 
(arguing that once Congress has made a decision about a policy matter, the Court is not 
free to ignore that decision). 
 69. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753-54; Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 749 
(1979) (holding that individuals denied admission on the basis of sex to an educational 
institution have an implied private right of action under Title IX); North Haven, 456 U.S. 
at 538 (upholding Title IX regulations prohibiting sex-based employment discrimination 
in federally funded educational institutions); Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 
U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that a student harassed by her teacher could seek monetary 
damages in a private claim under Title IX). 
 70. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754 (distinguishing Cannon and Franklin because neither 
case involved a claim of employee discrimination). 
 71. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (finding that employees are encompassed by Title IX’s 
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The Fifth Circuit was correct to dismiss Lakoski’s argument on the basis 
that these cases were distinguished from the facts and legal premises set out 
in the Lakoski case.72  The Fifth Circuit pointed out that North Haven, 
Franklin, and Cannon each failed to address the relationship between the 
remedial processes outlined in Title VII and Title IX, and specifically 
Franklin and Cannon, did not involve a claim of employment discrimination 
in a federally funded educational institution.73  In North Haven, the court 
held that employment discrimination on the basis of sex is included within 
Title IX’s broad discrimination prohibition.74  Although this case thoroughly 
analyzed Congress’s intent to extend Title IX to protect employees of 
educational institutions, the court does not conduct this analysis in relation 
to Title VII’s preexisting protections of this same class of employees.75  In 
Cannon, the court analyzed whether an implied right of action existed in the 
absence of an express right of action.76  The application of the Cort v. Ash 
test determined whether Congress did intend to include an implied right of 
action for a certain class of individuals.77  The court’s analysis, however, did 
not include any mention of Title VII.78 Therefore, the court did not properly 
consider Congress’s intent in relation to a right already existing expressly 
                                                          
private cause of action because the statutory language does not expressly exclude them). 
 72. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754 (refusing to acknowledge that Cannon, North Haven 
and Franklin amounted to a private right of action available to victims of employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex). 
 73. See id. (distinguishing North Haven, Franklin, and Cannon from Lakoski 
because the cases did not directly involve a discussion around Title VII’s remedial 
scheme while in Lakoski, circumventing Title VII’s remedial scheme is the central issue). 
 74. See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 530 (holding that although Title IX does not 
expressly protect employees of federally funded educational programs or activities, the 
statute implies a broad intention to include any individual in the educational program or 
activity). 
 75. See id. at 537-38 (relying on Title IX’s “program-specific” language and 
legislative history to affirm its extension to employees without addressing how this 
affects preexisting remedies applying to the same class of individuals). 
 76. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 678 (1979) (holding that even if Title 
IX does not expressly provide a private cause of action, courts may still find that 
Congress implied one by analyzing the statute with the four-steps from Cort v. Ash). 
 77. See id. at 688-89; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (establishing the 
four factors that would indicate Congressional intent: (1) whether the statute is meant to 
benefit a special class of which the plaintiff belongs, (2) whether there is legislative intent 
to create a private remedy, (3) whether the remedy is consistent with the purposes of the 
legislation, and (4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because it 
concerns the States). 
 78. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
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under Title VII.79  Finally, in Franklin, the court held that relief through 
monetary damages was allowed under Title IX because any appropriate relief 
is available to remedy the violation of a federal right.80  The court in Franklin 
relied heavily on the Cannon decision and similarly failed to consider the 
preexisting, well-established remedies available under Title VII for victims 
of employment discrimination on the basis of sex.81 
The Third Circuit failed to directly address the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of 
a private right of action under Title IX and instead attempted to reestablish 
this right by arguing that Congress meant to paint Title IX’s remedial 
measures with a broad stroke so as to not exclude employees in educational 
institutions that receive federal financial assistance.82  The Third Circuit 
incorrectly concluded that Title IX’s lack of explicit or implied exclusion of 
employees demonstrates that Congress intended for “persons” to include 
employees because “Congress easily could have substituted ‘student’ or 
‘beneficiary’ for the word ‘person’ if it had wished to restrict” Title IX’s 
remedial scope.83  The Third Circuit’s holding directly contradicts the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding regarding the application of Cannon and North Haven to 
reach the conclusion that an implied right of action exists under Title IX.84  
Additionally, the Third Circuit inadequately extended its analysis to include 
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education to support the assertion that the 
implied private cause of action derived from North Haven and Cannon 
explicitly extended to employees of educational institutions that receive 
federal financial assistance.85  The Third Circuit incorrectly applied the 
                                                          
 79. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695-96 (comparing Title IX’s implied rights with Title 
VI’s implied but not its express rights). 
 80. See Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (determining 
that monetary damages were an appropriate relief under Title IX for individuals who 
were victims of discrimination on the basis of sex). 
 81.  See id. at 72 (noting that in three previous cases where the Court found an implied 
right, it also found approved monetary damages, without mentioning Title VII). 
 82. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (arguing that 
Title IX’s private right of action includes not only students but employees as well). 
 83. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 562 (3d Cir. 2017) (interpreting 
Congress’s lack of an explicit or implied exclusion of “employees” to mean that 
Congress intended for employees to be included under Title IX’s remedial measures). 
 84.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709; North Haven, 456 U.S. at 535; see also Lakoski v. 
James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing the facts in Cannon and North 
Haven to determine that these cases presented legal questions in which Title VII was not 
directly implicated and therefore did not adequately address the relationship between 
Title VII and Title IX). 
 85. Compare Doe, 850 F.3d at 562-63 (maintaining that the Jackson case supports a 
wide reading of Title IX to include all individuals who are victims of intentional sex 
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Jackson case because the court failed to adequately address the Fifth 
Circuit’s pre-established argument that North Haven, Franklin, and Cannon 
do not amount to a private right of action under Title IX.86 
3. Title VII Expressly Provides Individuals with Administrative and 
Judicial Remedies While Title IX Expressly Provides Federal Agencies with 
the Ability to Withhold Funds to Address Known Employment 
Discrimination. 
The second part of the Fifth Circuit’s congressional intent analysis 
addressed the express and implied remedies that Congress intended to 
provide under Title VII and Title IX.87  The court carefully looked at the 
legislative histories to determine what Congress meant to accomplish with 
each statute.88  The Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that although Congress 
essentially created two remedies for the same right, it did so by tailoring the 
remedies available to different individuals.89  The remedies Congress created 
under each statute supported the Fifth Circuit’s compelling reasoning for 
which statute should be used to protect victims in different instances of 
discrimination on the basis of sex.90  The Fifth Circuit determined that 
Congress created a more robust and detailed remedy under Title VII in order 
for individuals like the plaintiff in Lakoski to seek relief under this statute 
                                                          
discrimination), with Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005) 
(clarifying that Title IX’s broad prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex includes 
narrow exceptions, and an implied private right of action for victims of retaliation is not 
one of these narrow exceptions). 
 86. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (finding an implied private right of action under Title 
IX by relying on an application of Jackson and Gwinnett). 
 87.  See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755-57 (distinguishing between Title VII, which provides 
a remedy to individual victims of employment discrimination, and Title IX, which 
provides a remedy by which administrative agencies can withhold federal funds from 
educational institutions that do not address allegations of discrimination). 
 88.  Compare id. (analyzing the timeline of Title VII’s extension to local and state 
government employees as well as concluding that Congress did not intend for Title IX 
to be a mechanism which could be used to circumvent preexisting Title VII remedies), 
with Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (declaring that the issue of whether an individual could 
circumvent Title VII’s remedial process was a policy issue that Congress has not 
expressly settled but that is up to Congress to address). 
 89. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 757 (concluding that Congress meant to provide 
individuals facing discrimination with administrative and judicial remedies under Title 
VII, and to empower federal agencies to withhold federal funds from educational 
institutions that fail to address employment discrimination). 
 90. See id. (explaining Title IX was intended to bolster the existing prohibitions on 
sex discrimination under Title VII). 
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instead of under other less robust and established statutes such as Title IX.91 
First, the Fifth Circuit adequately pointed out that Congress created only 
one main remedy expressly stated under Title IX.92  The Fifth Circuit 
concluded that among Title IX’s limited remedies, Congress only expressly 
provided the termination of federal financial assistance as the remedy for 
violations of Title IX.93  In Doe v. Mercy Catholic, the Third Circuit did not 
adequately analyze the implications surrounding the conclusions various 
courts have reached and thus also failed to fully explore the relationship 
between the remedial schemes of each statute.94  Second, the Fifth Circuit 
discussed separate cases in which courts have found that Title VII preempts 
Section 1983 and Section 1985 suits based on violations of Title VII rights.95  
The Fifth Circuit was correct in using Title IX’s limited remedial scheme 
along with the cases that hold Title VII to preempt other less specific 
remedies to conclude that Title VII also preempts the less specific Title IX 
remedial scheme.96 
In the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of Title VII as related to Section 1983 
claims, the court used Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. 
Novotny to correctly establish that in a fact pattern similar to the Lakoski 
case, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII preempts other remedies that if 
asserted could circumvent Title VII’s remedial administrative scheme.97  The 
                                                          
 91. See id. at 755-56 (reasoning that Congress intended to strengthen the already 
existing Title VII prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in federally 
funded educational institutions through Title IX but did not intend for Title IX to be a 
way for individuals to circumvent Title VII’s established remedial procedures). 
 92. Compare id. at 754-55, with Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 717 (1979) 
(finding an implied remedy in Title IX, although it was not expressly provided in the 
statute), and Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that 
individuals can seek relief under Title IX for claims of intentional discrimination). 
 93. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012) (discussing the 
protections available to victims of sex-based discrimination). 
 94. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 560, 563 (3d. Cir. 2017) 
(overlooking the role that Title VII’s remedial scheme plays in relation to Title IX’s 
remedial process). 
 95. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (declaring through these cases that the well-
established remedial structure of Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for Title VII 
rights); see also Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 377 (1979) 
(holding that Title VII precludes § 1985 claims when these claims are sought in violation 
of a Title VII right); Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418, 1428 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
Title VII precludes § 1983 claims). 
 96. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (questioning Title IX’s limited remedies and holding 
that Title VII’s established remedies preclude more general and less established statutory 
remedies). 
 97. See id. at 755 (determining that for rights created under Title VII, Title VII 
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Novotny case, along with the Brown v. GSA case, supports the Fifth Circuit’s 
correct assertion that Congress created Title VII’s remedial scheme with the 
purpose of creating a “precisely drawn, detailed statute” that “preempts more 
general remedies.”98  Since the Third Circuit did not thoroughly consider the 
precedent set by the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit failed to address why 
Title IX should be a bypass to Title VII’s established remedial process.99 
B. The Third Circuit Incorrectly Decided Doe v. Mercy Catholic Because 
It Failed to Distinguish Jackson from Lakoski and Failed to Address the 
Federal Financial Assistance Requirement. 
1. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education is Distinguished from Lakoski v. James. 
The Third Circuit determined that a medical resident could bring a claim 
under Title IX without having to bring a claim under Title VII.100  The Third 
Circuit relied on Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education to hold that the 
implied right of action the court derived from Cannon and North Haven 
extended to “employees of federally-funded education programs who allege 
sex-based retaliation claims under Title IX.”101  An important distinction 
noted by the Third Circuit is that Jackson was decided after the Fifth Circuit 
decided Lakoski in 1995.102  The Third Circuit ineffectively relies on the 
Jackson decision to support its holding without considering that this case is 
                                                          
provides the exclusive remedy). 
 98. See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 377; Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976) 
(extrapolating that Congress wrote specific rights and remedial structures into Title VII 
with the express purpose of Title VII preempting less specific remedial measures that 
seek to provide relief for the violation of rights created under Title VII). 
 99. Compare Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (maintaining that Title IX’s limited remedial 
structure only expressly includes the termination of federal funding), with Doe, 850 F.3d 
at 560, 563 (overlooking Title VII’s well-established remedial scheme as compared to 
Title IX’s limited remedial scheme). 
 100. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 563-64 (concluding that employees of educational 
institutions that receive financial funds have a private right of action under Title IX 
regardless of whether they could also bring that claim under Title VII). 
 101. See id. at 562 (emphasis added) (arguing specifically that retaliation against an 
employee for complaining about an instance of discrimination on the basis of sex is 
intentional sex discrimination); see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 
167, 171 (2005); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982); Cannon 
v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690-92 (1979). 
 102. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 563 (contrasting the assertion in Jackson that Title IX 
beneficiaries include anyone subjected to sex-based discrimination with the Fifth Circuit 
assertion ten years prior in Lakoski that Title VII is the sole remedy for medical residents 
who are victims of sex-based employment discrimination). 
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legally distinguished from Lakoski because Jackson does not adequately 
analyze the relationship between Title VII’s and Title IX’s remedial 
measures and procedures.103 
The Fifth Circuit properly dismissed the argument in Lakoski regarding 
the aggregate of the Cannon, Franklin, and North Haven cases because each 
of these cases did not thoroughly acknowledge and analyze the relationship 
between Title IX and Title VII in relation to each statute’s remedial 
procedures.104  In contrast with these three cases, the court in Jackson did 
address, to a limited extent, the relationship between Title VII and Title IX 
in terms of the remedial procedures expressed and implied in each statute.105  
The Third Circuit adopted for a broader reading of Title IX as espoused in 
Jackson and which allows Title IX to extend to all individuals and not just 
individuals who cannot succeed on a Title VII claim.106  The Third Circuit 
was wrong in its analysis because, in Jackson, the Supreme Court held that 
Title VII and Title IX are vastly different statutes and did not address the 
relationship between each statute’s remedial measures.107  Although the 
court briefly touched on the relationship between these two statutes, this 
analysis did not adequately address whether Title IX could be used to bypass 
Title VII’s remedial procedures.108 
 
 
                                                          
 103. See id. at 562 (rationalizing that if recipients of federal financial assistance could 
retaliate freely, then individuals who witness sex-based discrimination in the institutions 
where they work would be dissuaded from reporting the discrimination). 
 104. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753-54 (rejecting Lakoski’s claims that the aggregate of 
the Cannon, North Haven, and Franklin cases create an implied right of action because 
these cases failed to address Title IX in relation to Title VII). 
 105. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174-75 (comparing Title IX’s broad language, which 
implicitly prohibits retaliation against someone who complains about discrimination on 
the basis of sex, with Title VII’s express and specific prohibitions against retaliation 
against someone who complains about employment discrimination). 
 106. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 563 (noting that Congress’s use of the broad term 
“discrimination” indicates its intention to allow this statute to broadly cover individuals 
who experience a wide range of intentional unequal treatment on the basis of sex). 
 107. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 168, 175 (explaining that Title VII’s prohibition against 
retaliation is expressly mentioned while Title IX does not expressly mention this 
prohibition because Title IX is written as a broad prohibition against discrimination and 
includes exceptions to this broad prohibition while Title VII was written to specifically 
list the conduct it covers). 
 108. See id. at 175 (finding that since “Congress did not list any specific 
discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX, its failure to mention one such practice 
does not tell us anything about whether it intended that practice to be covered.”). 
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2. The Third Circuit Incorrectly Decided Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical 
Center Because Receiving Medicaid Funds that Stem from Contracts of 
Insurance Does Not Meet the Standard of Receiving Federal Financial 
Assistance Required by Title IX. 
The Third Circuit did not address in depth whether the type of funds 
received by Mercy Catholic Medical Center meet the standard required to be 
considered an educational institution receiving federal funds as required by 
Title IX.109  In Doe, the Third Circuit assumed that Mercy Catholic received 
federal financial assistance even when the medical center argued that the 
Medicare payments intended to supplement residency training costs instead 
“stem from contracts of insurance.”110  Mercy Catholic denied that the 
federal funds received would qualify as the federal funds required by Title 
IX.111 
The Third Circuit did not address the issue that the Medicare payments 
Mercy Catholic receives do not meet the necessary standard of federal 
financial funds because Mercy Catholic did not raise this issue in the district 
court.112  However, this question may guide future courts to distinguish the 
Third Circuit’s incorrect decision and correctly side with the Fifth Circuit’s 
opposing view.113  The Third Circuit emphasized the importance and far-
reaching effects that its decision could have on future cases.114 
The Third Circuit incorrectly interpreted the “contracts of insurance” to 
mean traditional contracts such as those involving “individual bank accounts 
                                                          
 109. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-82 (2012) (defining “federal financial assistance” to 
include the award or grant of money or other assistance in nonmonetary funds, but not 
contracts of guaranty or insurance by the federal government). 
 110. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 558 (denying review of Mercy Catholic’s argument in the 
circuit court because Mercy Catholic did not raise the issue in the district court). 
 111. See id. at 558; see also Brief for Appellee at 25, Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 
850 F.3d 545 (3d. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1247) (arguing that the Medicare funds received 
by Mercy Catholic fall under the express exclusion of the type of federal financial 
assistance statutorily required under Title IX). 
 112. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 558 (declining to address this argument in accordance to 
procedural rules and sending the issue back to the lower courts to decide). 
 113 . See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1995); Waid v. Merrill Area 
Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 865-66 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996) abrogated in part by Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Preston v. Virginia, 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 
1994) (disagreeing on whether employees at private medical residency programs that 
receive federal funds have concurrent liability under Title IV and Title IX). 
 114. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 552 (emphasizing that this question of first impression 
touches on the administrative power to address gender discrimination in medical 
residency programs through existing federal law). 
20
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss1/3
2018] FOLLOWING THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 93 
 
in a bank with federally guaranteed deposits.”115  The Third Circuit’s 
assumption that the Medicaid contract payments qualify as “federal financial 
assistance” is incorrect and could lead future courts to distinguish the Third 
Circuit’s argument that Title VII and Title IX provide concurrent liability for 
victims of employment discrimination to be able to seek relief under both 
statutes.116  If the Medicare payments received by Mercy Catholic are indeed 
contracts of insurance, then they would be a type of federal financial 
assistance that is expressly excluded from the Title IX definition of federal 
financial funds.117  Regulations under Title IX clarify the types of payments 
that qualify as federal financial assistance and specifically states that federal 
financial assistance includes “[a]ny other contract, agreement, or 
arrangement that has as one of its purposes the provision of assistance to any 
education program or activity, except a contract of insurance or guaranty.”118 
In Footnote 2 of Mercy Catholic’s appellee brief, Mercy Catholic Medical 
Center asserts that the payments made through the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs are defined as federal health insurance programs.119  Doe and the 
amicus brief filed in favor of Doe, argue that the Medicare and Medicaid 
insurance funds qualify as Graduate Medical Education (“GME”) funding 
and thus meet the threshold of federal financial assistance required to 
establish Title IX liability.120  On the other hand, Mercy Catholic argues that 
                                                          
 115. Id. at 558 (contending that all federal civil rights statutes intend to refer to 
contracts in the traditional meaning of the term) (citing United States v. Baylor Univ. 
Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1048 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 116. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 558 (presuming without deciding that Mercy Catholic 
receives the type of “federal financial assistance” statutorily required under Title IX, 
leaving it for the district court to address on remand). 
 117. See 20 U.S.C. § 1685 (2012) (requiring the educational program or activity to 
receive federal financial assistance in order for it to fall under the purview of Title IX); 
see also 45 C.F.R. § 618.105 (2012) (defining “federal financial assistance” as excluding 
federal contracts of guaranty or insurance). 
 118. See 45 C.F.R. § 618.105 (2012) (defining “federal financial funds” and providing 
the statutory exclusions for the types of funds and payments that do not qualify as federal 
financial assistance to an educational program or activity as required under Title IX). 
 119. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 25 n.2 (noting that federal insurance 
is a type of guarantee of insurance that is excluded from Title IX); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
1395; Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 506-07 (1994) (noting 
that Medicare is a federally funded health insurance program for elderly and disabled 
patients). 
 120. See Brief for Appellant at 13, Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d. 
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1247); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 13-14, Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d. Cir. 2017) 
(No. 16-1247) (defining GME funding as direct or indirect payments received through 
the Federal Medicare program to cover the costs related to educating medical residents). 
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the GME payments funded through Medicare and Medicaid payments 
qualify as “contracts of insurance” and are thus explicitly excluded as the 
type of federal financial assistance required under Title IX.121  In its brief, 
Mercy stated that it receives its federal financial payments directly from the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) for services rendered to 
elderly and disabled patients.122  Mercy clarifies that “[t]he GME payments 
are not ‘federal assistance,’ but rather, federal health insurance payments 
made directly to the hospital on behalf of the elderly and disabled patients to 
whom Mercy has provided hospital services.”123 
In Footnote 2, Mercy Catholic Medical Center asserts that whether 
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements constitute payments under a federal 
contract has not been addressed or resolved in conjunction with the statutory 
requirements expressed under Title IX.124  While the Third Circuit, in 
following procedural rules, does not address this argument, it still explains 
that the contracts of insurance brought up in Mercy Catholic’s brief tend to 
refer to traditional contracts “like those involving ‘individual bank accounts 
in a bank with federally guaranteed deposits.’”125  The Third Circuit’s 
explanation is wrong because these contracts of insurance are expressly the 
kind that are included as a statutory exception under Title IX.126 
                                                          
 121. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 7-8 n.2. 
 122. Id. at 7-8; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(a)(4) (regarding the classification of 
federal payments to hospitals for different types of inpatient services). 
 123. See Brief for Appellee at 7-8 n. 2, Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 
(3d. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1247); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 
1395ww(d)(5)(B) (2018) (addressing the direct and indirect costs for which HHS 
provides reimbursements to medical hospitals which include the costs of graduate 
medical education). 
 124. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 7-8 n.2 (noting that in Henschke v. 
New York Hosp. Cornell Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 166, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), the district 
court held in abeyance the question of whether Title IX covered the university hospital 
based on whether the hospital receives the type of federal financial assistance required 
to meet the requirements of Title IX). 
 125. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 558 (assuming without discussion that these types of 
contracts of insurance should be treated as traditional contracts) (citing United States v. 
Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1048 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 126. Compare Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 7-8 n.2 (arguing the Medicare 
payments received to support the teaching hospital are contracts of insurance that do not 
meet the definition of federal financial funds required under Title IX), with 45 C.F.R. § 
618.105 (1972) (defining “federal financial funds” and providing the statutory exclusions 
under Title IX). 
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III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The Third Circuit’s decision that remedial joint liability exists under Title 
VII and Title IX should not set a precedent for future courts.127  The attempt 
to broadly apply Title IX to instances of discrimination already covered 
under Title VII goes against the interest of strengthening protections for 
victims of sexual harassment in the workplace.  Applying Title IX’s less 
established and unclear remedial process could yield inconsistent results in 
the courts.  Title IX does not provide for a clear set of procedural guidelines 
that could be applied consistently and thoroughly to employment 
discrimination claims.128  Instead, Title IX relies on clarification from the 
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) to interpret 
Congress’s intent through nonbinding policy documents.129 
The Fifth Circuit’s legal conclusion that Title VII is the sole remedy for 
victims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex supports the 
compelling policy interest that Title VII’s robust remedial scheme should not 
be weakened by the creation of competing remedies.130  Congress expressly 
created the rights and supported these rights with a robust remedial scheme 
under Title VII to protect victims of sex-based discrimination in the 
workplace.131  Title VII provides a solid set of remedial measures that should 
not be undermined by seeking relief through other recourses, especially if 
these recourses are more general and less established.132  To strengthen the 
protections for victims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex, 
                                                          
 127. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 560 (holding that Title VII and Title IX allow for joint 
liability under which employees could seek relief for employment discrimination using 
either statute). 
 128. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2012) (codifying into law protections against 
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs or activities that receive 
federal financial assistance). 
 129. See, e.g., See, e.g., Dear Colleague Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting 
Assistant Sec'y for the Office of Civil Rights, Dep't of Educ. 1 (Sept. 22, 2017) (on file 
with Dep't of Educ.) (implementing Title IX’s regulatory requirements through 
nonbinding policy manuals and guidance). 
 130. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title VII 
provides the sole remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis 
of sex and that Congress did not intend for Title IX to provide a bypass to Title VII’s 
well-established administrative remedial process). 
 131. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2010) (codifying protections against discrimination on 
the basis of sex in the workplace); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2018) (establishing sexual 
harassment as a violation of section 703 of Title VII). 
 132. See id. (providing a robust, congressionally mandated administrative and judicial 
process for individuals who have experienced employment discrimination on the basis 
of sex). 
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future courts should determine that Title VII preempts all other less 
established remedies for the rights initially created under Title VII.133 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit correctly decided that Title VII is the sole avenue for 
individuals to file claims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex 
in educational institutions such as medical residency programs that receive 
federal financial assistance.134  The Fifth Circuit used a three-part test to 
comprehensively analyze the role of Title VII and Title IX and correctly 
determine that Title VII provides the most adequate and consequently sole 
remedy.135  First, the court analyzed the congressional intent and determined 
that Congress did not intend to create a bypass to Title VII’s robust remedial 
process through the provisions established by Title IX.136  Second, the court 
determined that the aggregate of Cannon v. University of Chicago, North 
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, and Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public 
Schools cases did not create an implied right of action that provides a remedy 
under Title IX.137  Finally, the court concluded that Title IX’s limited 
established remedies for claims of employment discrimination on the basis 
of sex indicate that Title VII was created as the main procedural avenue 
under which to bring these claims.138  As such, the Fifth Circuit was correct 
in concluding that Title VII’s remedial process preempts Title IX and is the 
sole remedy for claims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex. 
                                                          
 133. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (holding that Title VII’s precise, comprehensive, and 
well-established remedial process preempts Title IX’s unclear and unestablished 
remedial process). 
 134. See id. at 758 (concluding that Title VII is the sole remedy for employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex for rights created under Title VII). 
 135. See id. at 758 (concluding that Title VII’s well-established remedial process 
preempts other less specific remedies). 
 136. Compare id. at 758 (employing a two-step congressional intent analysis that 
pointed to Congress not intending for Title IX to provide a bypass to Title VII’s remedial 
process), with Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 560-63 (3d. Cir. 2017) 
(overlooking congressional intent relating to the relationship between Title VII’s and 
Title IX’s remedial processes). 
 137. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (dismissing with the argument that the aggregate of 
the Cannon, North Haven, and Franklin cases create an implied right of action because 
these cases failed to address Title IX in relation to Title VII). 
 138. See id. at 754 (establishing that the only remedy expressly provided in Title IX 
is the termination of federal funds to an educational institution that fails to adequately 
address allegations of known sexual harassment). 
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